

Steven J. Onysko

August 29, 2019

Gina Proctor
Executive Secretary
State Records Committee
346 S. Rio Grande
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1106

Ms. Proctor:

Subject: Title 63G-2-403 Appeal to State Records Committee of Office of Attorney General (OAG) Chief Administrative Officer's July 30, 2019, Denial [Attachment D] of Appellant's July 13, 2019, 63G-2-402 Appeal [Attachment C] of OAG Records Officer's July 12, 2019, Nonresponsive Fulfillment [Attachment B] of Appellant's June 14, 2019, GRAMA Request [Attachment A] vis-à-vis "Incoming and outgoing 385-249-0691 call records for State of Utah cellphone assigned to any State of Utah current or former employee, including, but not limited to, Bridget Romano, now-former Civil Chief Deputy (OAG), for the period April 1, 2018, through June 30, 2018."

Statutes Relevant to My Appeal Purpose

Utah Ann. Code, 76-8-402. Misusing public money or public property.

Utah Ann. Code, 67-16. Utah Public Officers' and Employees' Ethics Act. 67-16-4(1)(c)(ii) *Offense to secure special privileges for others.* [Paraphrase added.]

Utah Ann. Code, 63D-3-103. Permission to access a protected computer -- Revocation.

Utah Ann. Code, [GRAMA] 63G-2-801. Criminal penalties.

Utah Ann. Code, 76-6-404.5. Wrongful appropriation -- Penalties.

I hereby make Title 63G-2-403 GRAMA appeal of Office of Attorney General denial of my Title 63G-2-402 appeal to the OAG chief administrative officer:

63G-2-402. Appealing a decision of a chief administrative officer.
[Effective 5/14/2019]

(1) If the decision of the chief administrative officer of a governmental entity under Section 63G-2-401 is to affirm the denial of a record request, the requester may:

- (a)
 - (i) appeal the decision to the State Records Committee, as provided in Section 63G-2-403; or
 - (ii) petition for judicial review of the decision in district court, as provided in Section 63G-2-404; or
- (b) appeal the decision to the local appeals board if:
 - (i) the decision is of a chief administrative officer of a governmental entity that is a political subdivision; and
 - (ii) the political subdivision has established a local appeals board.

...

(3) As provided in Section 63G-2-403, an interested party may appeal to the State Records Committee a chief administrative officer's decision under Section 63G-2-401 affirming an access denial.

And,

63G-2-403. Appeals to the State Records Committee. [Effective 5/14/2019]

- (1) (a) A records committee appellant appeals to the State Records Committee by filing a notice of appeal with the executive secretary of the State Records Committee no later than 30 days after the date of issuance of the decision being appealed.

(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (1)(a), a requester may file a notice of appeal with the executive secretary of the State Records Committee no later than 45 days after the day on which the record request is made if:
 - (i) the circumstances described in Subsection 63G-2-401(1)(b) occur; and
 - (ii) the chief administrative officer fails to make a decision under Section 63G-2-401.
- (2) The notice of appeal shall:
 - (a) contain the name, mailing address, and daytime telephone number of the records committee appellant;
 - (b) be accompanied by a copy of the decision being appealed; and
 - (c) state the relief sought.
- (3) The records committee appellant:
 - (a) shall, on the day on which the notice of appeal is filed with the State Records Committee, serve a copy of the notice of appeal on:
 - (i) the governmental entity whose access denial is the subject of the appeal, if the records committee appellant is a requester or interested party; or
 - (ii) the requester or interested party who is a party to the local appeals board proceeding that resulted in the decision that the political subdivision is appealing to the committee, if the records committee appellant is a political subdivision; and
 - (b) may file a short statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of the appeal.

:

I have attached copies of:

[Attachment A] Appellant's June 14, 2019, GRAMA Request vis-à-vis "Incoming and outgoing 385-249-0691 call records for State of Utah cellphone assigned to any State of Utah current or former employee, including, but not limited to, Bridget Romano, now-former Civil Chief Deputy (OAG), for the period April 1, 2018, through June 30, 2018;

[Attachment B] OAG Records Officer's July 12, 2019, Nonresponsive Fulfillment of Appellant's June 14, 2019, GRAMA Request [Attachment A] vis-à-vis "Incoming and outgoing 385-249-0691 call records for State of Utah cellphone assigned to any State of Utah current or former employee, including, but not limited to, Bridget Romano, now-former Civil Chief Deputy (OAG), for the period April 1, 2018, through June 30, 2018;

[Attachment C] Appellant's July 13, 2019, 63G-2-402 Appeal of OAG Records Officer's July 12, 2019, Nonresponsive Fulfillment [Attachment B] of Appellant's June 14, 2019, GRAMA Request [Attachment A] vis-à-vis "Incoming and outgoing 385-249-0691 call records for State of Utah cellphone assigned to any State of Utah current or former employee, including, but not limited to, Bridget Romano, now-former Civil Chief Deputy (OAG), for the period April 1, 2018, through June 30, 2018;

[Attachment D] Office of Attorney General (OAG) Chief Administrative Officer's July 30, 2019, Denial of Appellant's July 13, 2019, 63G-2-402 Appeal [Attachment C] of OAG Records Officer's July 12, 2019, Nonresponsive Fulfillment [Attachment B] of Appellant's June 14, 2019, GRAMA Request [Attachment A] vis-à-vis "Incoming and outgoing 385-249-0691 call records for State of Utah cellphone assigned to any State of Utah current or former employee, including, but not limited to, Bridget Romano, now-former Civil Chief Deputy (OAG), for the period April 1, 2018, through June 30, 2018;

ISSUES FOR WHICH APPELLANT SEEKS RELIEF PER TITLE 63G-2-401(2)(b)

Historical Events Context

1. Former Civil Chief Deputy, Bridget K. Romano, Utah Office of Attorney General (OAG), had "last day with the office ... April 6, 2018." This information was provided to me by Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Lonny J. Pehrson. This fulfilled my GRAMA request [Attachment E], dated June 14, 2019, with specific GRAMA request for, "Date of employment separation, including but not limited to, 'last date of remuneration by State of Utah,' from OAG for Bridget K. Romano, former Civil Chief Deputy, Office of the Utah Attorney General."

AAG Pehrson provided the information to me in GRAMA response 19-077, dated June 28, 2019 [Attachment F].

2. Former Civil Chief Deputy, Bridget K. Romano, Utah Office of Attorney General (OAG), had employment start date, April 9, 2018, with the Salt Lake County District Attorney Office. This information was provided to me by David V. Pena, Deputy District Attorney (DDA), Salt Lake County District Attorney Office. This fulfilled my GRAMA request [Attachment G], dated June 14, 2019, with specific GRAMA request for, "Salt Lake County government documentation of employment start date, reputed in a County April 6, 2018, press release to be (*sic*) [released] April 9, 2018, of current County employee, Bridget Romano, Assistant Division Administrator, Salt Lake County District Attorney Civil Division."

DDA Pena provided the information to me in GRAMA response dated June 19, 2019, [Attachment H].

3. There exists public record from the Unified Police Department - Greater Salt Lake (GO# CO 2018-77533) [Attachment I, proof of requested public document] of report to Unified Police Department of Greater Salt Lake. The report concerns purported May 23, 2018, discovery by a vehicle's operator of theretofore unattended parked vehicle driver's door being found slightly open, and HP Pro Book laptop computer, and an iPhone 6 May 22, missing from the inside of the vehicle. The report records the event as a May 22, 2018, burglary.

The report author, George Jeknavorian, states in the report that he was informed by the individual with whom he spoke that "[B]oth items which were stolen are owned by the Utah Attorney General's Office. Both items had Utah State ID tags on them."

The report identifies follow-up author, Stephanie Warden who is quoted in the report that she was informed by the person with whom she spoke of more facts. Namely, that person, "realized her prescription glasses were also stolen at the time of the vehicle prowl, along with a prox card for the Utah State Capitol and Heber M. Wells Office Building. Both prox cards have been deactivated ... DA badge was sitting on the drivers (*sic*) seat and left behind."

Abbreviated Explanation of Appellant's Purpose in Seeking All of the Records Requested in the Subject GRAMA Request, and Insisting that He Receive Them in Non-Redacted Format, from OAG.

The OAG's then-former Civil Chief Deputy indisputably had in her possession on May 22, 2018 -- 46 days after her separation date from OAG and her State of Utah government employer -- a computer laptop and a cellphone which were property of the State of Utah.

The citizens of Utah have a right to explanation of why on May 22, 2018, a separated State employee was still in possession of State resources. These resources included a laptop computer inferably loaded with confidential records whose loss is indisputably severe security breach, and invasion of privacy of any individuals identified in those records..

The citizens of Utah have a right to examine documents such as telephone calls to and from the cellphone number in question. The citizens of Utah have a right to determine whether or not a separated State employee, effective April 6, 2018, continued to possess and use State resources after April 6, 2018, at any time up until, and even after, the purported theft of the State property. Unredacted telephone numbers to and from the subject 385-249-0691 are appropriate for the public to access and view. Such data could help follow-up investigators investigate who the respective parties in each telephone call identified in the records were. Call date and call-participating individual identities, for telephone calls both before and after the former State employee's April 6, 2018, separation date, and before and after the purported theft of the State property, are germane.

Appellant's Relief Requested from the State Records Committee

I request relief from the circumstances that the Office of Attorney General has twice denied me access to the public records that I have requested [Attachments B and D] through initial GRAMA request, and then GRAMA denial appeal, respectively. The denial of my access to public records is two-fold.

First, OAG has redacted the preponderance of telephone numbers in the telephone records that OAG provided to me.

Second, OAG provided no telephone records, either appropriately unredacted or even redacted, from the inferable "Due August 5, 2018," billing records, which inferably include telephone calls between June 14, 2018, and July 13, 2018. My initial GRAMA request included the June 2018 portion of this inferable record that OAG did not provide. My June 14, 2019, GRAMA request, to OAG [Attachment A], explicitly requested telephone records for the period "April 1, 2018, through June 30, 2018."

The Solicitor General, Tyler Green, in July 30, 2019, defiance of his GRAMA obligations, disingenuously wrote [Attachment D]:

"The lack of any call records after April 14, 2018, does not show that there are missing records. Instead, it is consistent with the fact that Ms. Romano left the office in early April 2018 and ceased using the phone shortly thereafter." *Solicitor General Tyler Green*

The Unified Police Department - Greater Salt Lake report [Attachment I] substantiates that the former Civil Chief Deputy had the cellphone in her possession up to May 22, 2018, some 46 days after the separation from State employment. Solicitor General Green's assertion that Romano did not use the cellphone after her April 2018 separation from OAG employment is not good enough for me.

The Solicitor General's argument is at best illogical, but Appellant infers poorly-veiled stonewalling. It is patently absurd for the Solicitor General to refuse GRAMA fulfillment of the telephone records after April 6, 2018, because the former Civil Chief Deputy separated from State employment on that date yet still had possession of the cellphone until May 22, 2018. The citizens of Utah have the right to view, access, and interpret telephone records after that date to find out whether or not all statutes and laws have been respected.

Optional Title 63G-2-403(3)(b) Short Statement of Facts, Reasons, and Legal Authority in Support of the First of the Two Facets of the Appeal, Namely, Non-Fulfillment of the Appellant's Request for Telephone Records between June 14, 2018, and July 13, 2018, with Respect to Cellphone Number 385-249-0691.

The Office of Attorney General failed to comply with its obligation: (i) to allow me Title 63G-2-201 right to inspect the telephone records that I so requested, June 14, 2018, through June 30, 2018; or (ii) provide me Title 63G-2-205 notice of denial of my request to view the records.

OAG has obligation to allow me to view the telephone records in entirety that I requested. OAG's denial misrepresents my request as a request only for telephone records that the former Civil Chief Deputy might have precipitated with respect to cellphone 385-249-0691. I requested telephone records that any current or former State employee may have precipitated with respect to cellphone 385-249-0691. The separation from State Service of the former Civil Chief Deputy prior to the last date of my window of dates of requested service is a "red herring" proffered by the Solicitor General. His denial of telephone records release cites the former Civil Chief Deputy's separation date. But, that does not prove that she could not have continued to use the cellphone that remained in her possession until purported May 22, 2018, theft from her personal vehicle, 46 days after separation from State employment..

I also raise objection that records that the OAG did provide to me were unacceptably disorganized and truncated with respect to page number quantities printed on the telephone records. [See Attachment J for analysis.]

Optional Title 63G-2-403(3)(b) Short Statement of Facts, Reasons, and Legal Authority in Support of the Second of the Two Facets of the Appeal, Namely, OAG's Illegitimate Redaction of Telephone Numbers from the Telephone Records Provided to Appellant.

My appeal is about concerns similar to some addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in *Schroeder v. Utah Attorney General's Office and the Utah State Records Committee*, 358 P.3d 1075 (2015), 2015 UT 77. My appeal is about citizen right to investigate if there is corruption in State of Utah government, such as elected official or other public servant loaning State property without authority of law.

"[T]he [District] court's balancing analysis improperly focused on general policy concerns without discussing how those interests specifically applied to the records at issue in this case. Applying the proper standard, we conclude that the records should be disclosed because Ogden's citizens have a right to know about potential public corruption ..."

Utah Title 76, Utah Criminal Code, Chapter 8, Offenses Against the Administration of Government, Section 402, at § 76-8-402, Misusing public money or public property, states:

76-8-402. Misusing public money or public property.

...

(2) It is unlawful for a public servant to:

(a) appropriate public money or public property to the public servant's own use or benefit or to the use or benefit of another without authority of law;

(b) loan or transfer public money or public property without authority of law;

My appeal is about obtaining public records from the Office of the Attorney General to assist my citizen's investigation, I have citizen right to investigate whether or not a public servant in the Office of the Attorney General, or maybe the Department of Technology Services (DTS), unlawfully loaned State of Utah public property, in the form of State laptop computer and State cellphone, to the former Civil Chief Deputy. If there was loan, it was for a lengthy 46 days between the Deputy's April 6, 2018, separation from State employment and the May 22, 2018, purported theft of that State property from the then-former Deputy's personal vehicle at her personal residence, The last 43 days of that window, commencing April 9, 2018, employment at the Salt Lake County District Attorney Office, begs the question of whether or not the former Civil Chief Deputy was sharing State laptop computer files with her new employer, the Salt Lake County District Attorney.

The former Civil Chief Deputy's immediate supervisor is Utah Attorney General Sean Reyes. He, as a Utah public servant, is accountable to Utah Title 67, Chapter 16, Utah Public Officers' and Employees' Ethics Act. Everyone is accountable to the law. The Act states:

67-16 -4 Improperly privileges or exemptions -- Accepting employment that would impair independence of judgment or ethical performance -- Exception [*disclosing or using private, controlled, or protected information -- Using position to secure*]. [*Explanation added.*]

(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), it is an offense for a public officer, public employee, or legislator to:

...

(c) use or attempt to use his official position to:

- (i) further substantially the officer's or employee's personal economic interest; or
- (ii) secure special privileges or exemptions for himself or others;

My appeal is about obtaining public records to help in finding answer to the question of who authorized the inferable loan of State property to the former Civil Chief Deputy, and if that person had purpose of securing special privileges for the former Civil Chief Deputy. It is indisputable that everyday citizens of Utah are not afforded use of State laptop computers or cellphones, and certainly not for personal use at personal residence or for use in non-State employment.

My appeal is about obtaining public records to help in finding answer to the question did the former Civil Chief Deputy at separation from State service on April 6, 2018, unlawfully take State property including laptop computer and cellphone from her former State government workplace. It is indisputable that the former Civil Chief Deputy had for some 46 days possession of a State laptop computer of inferable sensitive electronic files of protected confidentiality and restricted access. She may warrant scrutiny with respect to Utah Title 63D, Information Technology Act, Chapter 3, Unauthorized Access to Information Technology, Part 1, Computer Abuse and Data Recovery Act, § 63D-3-103, Permission to access a protected computer -- Revocation. That Act states:

63D-3-103. Permission to access a protected computer -- Revocation.
Effective 5/10/2016.

(1) Subject to Subsections (2) and (3), an individual has permission to access a protected computer if:

(a) the individual is a director, officer, employee, agent, or contractor of the protected computer's owner; and

(b) the protected computer's owner gave the individual express permission to access the protected computer through a technological access barrier.

(2) If a protected computer's owner gives an individual permission to access the protected computer, the permission is valid only to the extent or for the specific purpose the protected computer's owner authorizes.

(3) An individual's permission to access a protected computer is revoked if:

(a) the protected computer's owner expressly revokes the individual's permission to access the protected computer; or

(b) the individual ceases to be a director, officer, employee, agent, or contractor of the protected computer's owner.
[Emphasis added.]

My appeal is about obtaining public records to help in finding answer to the question why the former Civil Chief Deputy in having possession for 46 days of a State laptop computer of inferable sensitive electronic files of protected confidentiality and restricted access should not be held accountable under Utah Title 63G, General Government, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act, § 63G-2-801, Criminal penalties, which States:

63G-2-801 Criminal penalties.

...

(2)

(a) A person who by false pretenses, bribery, or theft, gains access to or obtains a copy of any private, controlled, or protected record to which the person is not legally entitled is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

My appeal is about obtaining public records to help in finding answer to the question of whether or not any individual is accountable to Utah Title 76, Utah Criminal Code, Chapter 6, Offenses Against Property, Part 4 Theft, Section 404.5, Wrongful appropriation -- Penalties. Utah Title § 76-6-404.5, Wrongful appropriation -- Penalties, states:

76-6-404.5. Wrongful appropriation -- Penalties.

(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another, without the consent of the owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, or use the property or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of possession of the property.

(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of the property to its control by the actor is not presumed or implied because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the control of the property by any person.

My appeal is about obtaining State Records Committee intercession to order the Office of the Attorney General to desist from prohibited conduct. I seek order that OAG generally shall not deny public access to public records including my requested unredacted telephone records from OAG.

And, my appeal is about obtaining State Records Committee intercession to order the Office of the Attorney General that it specifically shall not deny public access to public records with fraudulent and illegitimate invocation of GRAMA provision with respect to "attorney-client privilege" for OAG's purpose of misrepresenting public records as not being public records.

In twice denying my GRAMA request for the unredacted telephone records of the Civil Chief Deputy, OAG fraudulently invoked the GRAMA provision that exclude from public records classification records deemed records of "attorney-client" privilege. Namely, the OAG has perverted GRAMA for purpose of shielding the former Civil Chief Deputy's telephone records from scrutiny. OAG fraudulently invoked the following GRAMA provision at § 63G-3-305, which states:

63G-2-305. Protected records. [Effective 5/14/2019]

The following records are protected if properly classified by a governmental entity:

...

(17) records that are subject to the attorney client privilege;

...

This Committee should rely upon its precedent and order that the OAG stop the charade that unredacted telephone numbers are data that merit attorney-client privilege restrictions of public access.

Namely, the Utah State Records Committee, May 22, 2017, at "Decision and Order," Case No. 17-19, Steven J. Onysko, Petitioner, v. Jordanelle Special Service District, Respondent, unequivocally decided that:

"After having reviewed the written arguments of the parties, hearing testimony and arguments at the hearing, the Committee finds that Mr. Onysko is entitled to receive unredacted copies of the requested [telephone] records. The Committee is not convinced that release of telephone numbers of individuals making or receiving telephone calls from a governmental entity is considered a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.' As stated by the Utah Supreme Court, 'a record may not be withheld merely because its contents invade personal privacy. Instead, the invasion must be clearly unwarranted.' " (Deseret News Publishing Co. v. Salt Lake City, 2008 UT 26, ~ 33, 182 P.3d 372).

...

"THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT the appeal of Petitioner, Steven J. Onysko, is hereby GRANTED."

Arguendo, even if OAG could make a credible argument for attorney-client privilege invocation of restricted public access to the unredacted telephone numbers, weighing provision holding in *Schroeder v. Utah Attorney General's Office and the Utah State Records Committee*, 358 P.3d 1075 (2015), 2015 UT 77, would override even otherwise valid argument by the OAG:

¶ 52 We first clarify how district courts should weigh the interests and public policies discussed in Utah Code section 63G-2-404(8)(a) [now 63G-2-404(7)(a)]. That provision allows a district court to disclose otherwise GRAMA-protected records if the interests in favor of disclosure outweigh those favoring protection. It provides,

The court may, upon consideration and weighing of the various interests and public policies pertinent to the classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the disclosure of information properly classified as private, controlled, or protected if the interest favoring access outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access.⁷²

[⁷²] Utah Code § 63G-2-404(8)(a) [now § 63G-2-404(7)(a)];

Applying section 404, the district court determined that the relevant interests and policy concerns did not favor disclosure. In so doing, the court weighed three different public policies: (1) "the public's right to

know," (2) "attorney work product" protections, and (3) "the right of the individual to be free from individual searches, under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution."

¶ 58 Having clarified the analysis district courts should undertake when weighing the interests for and against disclosure under section 404(8)(a), we now apply that standard to the facts of this case. We first note that the public's right to know is particularly weighty in this case. According to the allegations in the complaint ... [t]hese allegations, if true, indicate that an elected official breached the public trust ..."

...

¶ 60 On balance, then, it is clear to us that the public's right to access the ... documents relevant to potential corruption in the Ogden Mayor's Office — outweighs the State's interest in protecting the mental impressions and legal theories that might be disclosed in either document. We therefore reverse the district court's decision protecting these documents from disclosure.

And, to reiterate, I argue that attorney-client privilege is not even relevant in my appeal of redacted telephone numbers. But I reserve the right to Schroeder relief if this Committee disagrees. The public has overriding interest in knowing how the former Civil Chief Deputy came to possess, and possibly use, State property of cellphone and laptop computer for nearly seven weeks after her separation from State employment. The investigative trail begins with the unredacted telephone numbers.

My argument that attorney-client privilege does not apply to State cellphone records vis-à-vis legitimate redaction of telephone numbers is well-grounded in case law.

Federal law places the burden of establishing the attorney-client privilege, including each of its elements, squarely on the party asserting it. (See, e.g., *U.S. v. Jones*, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982); *Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Mgmt.*, 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1981).

"The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion of law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client." (*United States v. United States Shoe Machinery Corp.*, 89 F.Supp. 357 (1950), U.S. Dist., D. Massachusetts).

In order for the attorney-client privilege to apply, the allegedly protected communication must be between a lawyer and the lawyer's client. In my appeal, OAG has not asserted that the redacted telephone records of the Civil Chief Deputy are telephone numbers of any clients of hers or even other State attorneys.


In the seminal case, *Upjohn Company v. United States*, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court noted:

"[T]he protection of the [attorney-client] privilege extends only to communications and not to facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely different thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, 'what did you say or write to the attorney?' but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney." (citations omitted).

Telephone numbers are facts, and the OAG's repeated assertion to the contrary does not constitute successful argument. Telephone numbers are not demonstration of attorney-client relationship existence. Telephone numbers do not constitute attorney-client privileged discussion.

Appellant appeals for opportunity more thoroughly to argue and prove to the State Records Committee that the OAG's invocations of the attorney-client privilege are without foundation in this matter.

Respectfully,



Steven J. Onysko



August 28, 2019

cc: Gina Proctor, Executive Secretary, Utah State Records Committee, gproctor@utah.gov
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